독일사람들의 묘한 러시아 사랑 (by Clemens Wergin)

독일 디벨트지(Die Welt) 기자 블로그에 실린 재미있는 글입니다.

 

 

Germany’s strange love for Russia (독일의 묘한 러시아 사랑) 7. Mai 2014

 

I find the German debate about Russia’s aggression against Ukraine disappointing and embarassing. There is a multitude of former politicians (two former chancelors Helmut Schmidt and Gerhard Schröder among them) and public figures populating German TV shows and news and making the case for Russia. According to them Nato and the EU were the real aggressor because they had dared to expand into territory that belong to Moscow’s legitimate sphere of interest. And the peoples inhabiting the space between Germany and Russia are treated like lesser nations with lesser rights to sovereignty. This evokes memories of the bad old days in Europe I argue in a new column in the New York Times.

 

 

클레멘스 베어긴 기자가 뉴욕타임즈에 기고한 글을 아래 당겨와서 읽어봅니다. (베어긴 기자는 함부르크 대학에서 공부한 독일사람입니다.)

 

 

Why Germans Love Russia(독일인들은 왜 러시아에 우호적인가)  MAY 5, 2014

 

Like most foreign-policy experts, I was shocked by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its continuing “soft invasion” of eastern Ukraine. Can such a naked land grab really be happening now, in 21st-century Europe?

 

But Russia’s actions were not the only surprise. If you have followed the German debate about the Ukraine crisis, you have witnessed another strange phenomenon: a parade of former politicians and public figures going on TV to make the case for Russia.

 

According to these august figures — including former Chancellors Gerhard Schröder and Helmut Schmidt — NATO and the European Union were the real aggressors, because they dared to expand into territory that belonged to Moscow’s legitimate sphere of interest. And it seems part of the German public agrees.

 

You thought that Germans were the champions of international law and a rules-based world order? Think again.

 

There is a blatant hypocrisy here. At times the same people who had relied on international law to attack the American invasion of Iraq are now, as newborn realists, excusing Russia’s need to infringe on the sovereignty of other nations.

 

In point of fact, despite its trumped-up charges against Iraq, the Bush administration had at least 16 United Nations Security Council resolutions to support its case. Vladimir V. Putin, Russia’s president, had zero. The only common denominator of both positions seems to be an underlying anti-Americanism.

 

Some of this pro-Moscow sentiment is the work of Russia-sponsored propaganda: A recent investigative report by the newspaper Welt am Sonntag revealed how a shady network of Russia supporters has shaped public discourse in Germany. Even dialogue forums with Russia, co-sponsored by the German government, are full of friends of Mr. Putin, even on the German side.

 

But there is also a disturbing undercurrent among ordinary Germans that harks back to old and unfortunate German traditions. We have come to think of Germany as a Western European country, but that is largely a product of Cold War alliances. Before then it occupied a precarious middle between east and west.

 

Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, German society may well be drifting away from the West again. In a poll last month by Infratest/dimap, 49 percent of Germans said they wanted their country to take a middle position between the West and Russia in the Ukraine crisis, and only 45 percent wanted to be firmly in the Western camp.

 

This anti-Westernism is coming from both sides of the political spectrum. There is the part of the left that is instinctively anti-American and takes the side of whatever international actor happens to challenge the status quo and the leading Western power.

 

Then there is Europe’s populist right, which agrees with Russia’s propaganda that Europe has become too gay, too tolerant, too permissive in its morals and too un-Christian, and which welcomes an authoritarian leader challenging Europe’s fuzzy multilateralism.

 

In Germany, you can find this current best represented by the new anti-euro Alternative für Deutschland Party. They take up a conservative strain of German thinking dating back to the 19th century, which harbors a resentment toward Western civilization and romanticizes a Russia seemingly uncorrupted by Western values and free-market capitalism.

 

Both versions of anti-Westernism have been around for decades; until now, though, they have been confined to the political fringes. These days they are accepted by parts of the elite and sections of the political center. That, combined with the enormous investment by German companies in Russia, is placing constraints on how aggressively the government of Angela Merkel, Germany’s strongly pro-Western chancellor, can act against Russia.

 

What unites the apologists on the left and right is a striking disregard for the fate of the people who inhabit the lands between Germany and Russia, and a truncated notion of German history.

 

Some apologists will explain their sympathy as a matter of debt to Russia for German atrocities during World War II. But it is important to remember that the war started with Germany invading Poland from the West — and a few days later the Soviet Union invading Poland from the East, after both sides had secretly agreed to split Eastern Europe between them.

 

And so when German public figures, parroting Russian propaganda, dismiss Ukraine as “not a real country anyway,” or treat countries at the fault line between the West and Russia as second-class nations with somewhat lesser sovereignty, they are evoking memories in Eastern Europe of the bad old days, when the Nazis and Soviets turned the region into the “Bloodlands” of their respective dictatorships.

 

For decades Germany has tried to come to terms with its fascist past and to learn important lessons from it. And now, in another country, there comes an authoritarian leader who is trying to stabilize his regime by pursuing aggression abroad on the grounds of ethnic nationalism.

 

For anyone who has grappled with Germany’s Nazi past, it should have been easy to call right from wrong in this case, instead of finding excuses for Russia’s actions. It’s a test that too many of my compatriots have failed.

 

To be fair, in a recent poll 60 percent of Germans said that their country should stand with the West in the Ukraine crisis. So Russia’s ongoing aggression is having some effect on public opinion. But that still means that nearly half of all Germans do not feel a deep connection with the West and its values — which is precisely what Mr. Putin wants.

 

Clemens Wergin is the foreign editor of the German newspaper group Die Welt and the author of the blog Flatworld.

 

 

이 칼럼에 대한 가장 인상적인 독자댓글 중 하나는 pieceofcake라는 아이디의 것으로 “이 멍청한 독일 기고자 녀석(this silly German 'contributer')”이라고 직격탄을 날립니다.

 

pieceofcake

Or let me suspect - if there might be something German conservatives share with American conservatives - its a more simplistic view of the world - I mean - nobody beats American conservatives in their simplistic view of the world - but here we have a German -(Mr. Wergin) who comes up with a lot of simplistic reasons for 'Why Germans Love Russia' - and I tell'ya guys Germans even love Americans more - and let's not even talk about Italy -

I mean Germans absolutely ADORE Italy - (you know the Goethe thing and all) - and let#s not forget Spain! Germans are totally crazy about Spain -(and especially Mallorca) - AND Greece!! - Do y#all kjnow how many Germans are INSISTING to spend every available vacation day -(and they have a lot of these - IN GREECE) - and we absolutely should NOT forget how much Germans REALLY love America - and if you guys EVER met one of these very, VERY enthusiastic German tourists in LA NY LV or SF you know about the immense and unstopable love of the Germans for everything American -

 

So - in other words - the German LOVE might have been just too complex of for this silly German 'contributer' - and could you guys at zhe NYT let ME write about the Germans love for Italy -( I could promise a much more 'entertaining' piece - if 'entertaining' was the objection)

 

 

pieceofcake의 댓글에는 다음과 같은 지지 댓글도 달려 있습니다.

 

r2d2

To be honest: I like what you wrote.

I just thought to post a comment such as "Why Germans love Mallorca" (Ballermann).

Please write your article about the German love for Italy here at NYT!

I'm pretty sure that it promises more entertainment then the question of Mr. Wergin "Why Germans love Russia".

 

 

 

독일신문 해당 블로그 글에는 아래와 같은 통렬한 댓글이 눈에 띕니다.

 

 

Ernst Joseph Bingener

Es hinterlässt immer ein peinliches Gefühl, wenn sich Journalisten oder Politiker an ausländische Medien wenden, um ihr Land oder große Teile der Bevölkerung anzuschwärzen und sich selbst als" apple polisher" und Musterknabe zu empfehlen. Das war schon abstoßend, als Frau Merkel sich angesichts der Irak Invasion als Vasallin im Wartestand empfahl und Kanzler Schröder in den Rücken viel. Einige Nummern kleiner versucht das nun auch Clemens Wergin. Schade, aber es bestätigt nur den bisherigen Eindruck von ihm.

 

 

 

이 댓글이 아마도 아팠던지 베어긴 기자는 다음과 같이 반론을 달고 있습니다.

 

 

Wundert mich, dass der Nestbeschmutzervorwurf nicht schon früher kam. Zur Erinnerung: ich habe mich nicht an die New York Times "gewandt", um Deutschland anzuschwärzen. Sondern ich schreibe dort jeden Monat eine Kolumne, die ich diesmal dem Thema gewidmet habe, das mir derzeit am meisten auf den Nägeln brennt. So einfach ist das

 

 

 

클레멘스 베어긴 기자의 생각이 짧습니다. 독일을 미텔오이로파(Mitteleuropa)로 규정하는 독일사람들의 지혜로운 생각에 대해 클레멘스 베어긴 기자는 자신의 이스라엘 체험으로 맞서려는 우둔함을 보여주는 것은 아닌지 조심스럽습니다. 중국과 일본 사이의 한반도를 어떻게 규정해야 하는가 하는 어려운 문제가 떠오르기 때문입니다. ‘미텔 동아시아’가 될 수 없기 때문일까요?